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The quarter of a century between 1972 and 1996 witnessed the end of the
Imperial Age of school administration in British Columbia. The historical pattern
of strong central control which had directed the course of provincial schooling
for a century was beginning to unravel even before the 1960s were over,
prompted in part by a malaise inside educational government and by new forces
in and outside schools. Although provincial authorities entered the 1970s still
confident in their capacity to control and direct public education, the Ministry of
Education found itself before the decade ended, like Napoleon’s army retreating
from Moscow, bewildered by an unfamiliar landscape and harried on all sides by
adversaries who seemed to materialize from nowhere, each with its own special
brief for provincial schools.  By the 1980s, the province’s education bureaucracy,
once the dominant and solitary voice in school affairs, was obliged to compete
on the public policy stage with a chorus of others eager to contest the province’s
right to speak on behalf of children. By the mid-1990s, the rising power of the
teachers’ Federation, increasing parental and public demands for participation in
educational decisions, and the Ministry of Education’s ambiguity about its own
purpose had all served, in various ways, to reduce the province’s leadership in
public education.
 
Le quart de siècle compris entre les années 1972 et 1996 témoigne de la fin
de l’époque « impériale » de l’administration scolaire en Colombie-Britannique.
Le modèle historique de l’autorité centrale forte, qui avait caractérisé la direction
des programmes scolaires de la province depuis un siècle, avait commencé à
s’effriter avant même la fin des années 1960,  sous l’effet conjugué d’un malaise
existant chez les autorités scolaires et de la présence de forces nouvelles tant à
l’intérieur qu’à l’extérieur des écoles. Bien que les autorités provinciales
entamèrent les années 1970 confiantes en leur capacité à contrôler et à diriger
l’instruction publique, le ministre de l’Éducation se retrouva lui-même, avant la
fin de la décennie, dans une situation analogue à la retraite des armées
napoléoniennes devant Moscou : dérouté par un environnement inconnu et
harcelé de tous côtés par des adversaires qui semblaient surgir de nulle part,
chacun présentant son propre projet pour les écoles de la province. Vers les
années 1980, l’administration scolaire provinciale, qui était auparavant la voix
dominante et unique en matière scolaire, fut forcée à rivaliser avec une armée de
groupes, impatients de contester le droit de la province de parler au nom des
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enfants. Au milieu des années 1990, le force montante de la Fédération des
enseignants, les demandes croissantes des parents et de la population ainsi que
les objectifs ambigus du ministre de l’Éducation  avaient, de différentes
manières, contribué à réduire l’autorité de la province dans le domaine de
l’instruction publique.
The following discussion examines the changing character of
the British Columbia Ministry of Education during the quarter of
a century that began in 1972 and ended in 1996.  More specifically,
it explores the myriad social, political and economic forces that
reshaped both the form and function of this government bureau
during this period and how these forces served to change and,
ultimately, diminish the pivotal role this branch of government
historically played in developing and governing provincial schools
since the establishment of the public education system in 1872. 
“A World in Itself”
Public school history in British Columbia is, essentially, a
history in two parts. From 1872, when public education was first
organized, until 1972, when the Department of Education was on
the eve of becoming a “ministry” of government, control of
provincial schooling was highly centralized and virtually all major
decisions about schools were made within the province’s
educational bureau on Victoria’s Government Street. True to its
nineteenth-century origins, British Columbia’s school governance
system was colonial in manner and imperial in character.  The
Education Office (after 1920 the Department of Education)
functioned similarly to the colonial offices that governed the
British Empire. The great educational dominion marked by
provincial borders was divided into discrete territorial domains
presided over by Her Majesty’s school inspectors, who acted much
like the British district commissioners who managed far-flung
corners of the Empire. Like the Raj in India, it was a system of
government in which information flowed upward from the field and
decisions flowed downward from headquarters. Desk-bound in
stately offices within the Legislative Buildings, the province’s chief
school officers operated the system by remote control, dispatching
directives to inspectors who ensured that the province’s will – in
the form of rules, regulations, and curricular prescriptions – was
closely followed in schools from the wind-swept coast across the
Rocky Mountain trench into the grassy plains of the high plateau.
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In short, as the 1960s ended, the Department of Education, like the
province, was “a world in itself” that had “not quite relinquished its
old aspiration to be an Empire,” to quote historian Margaret
Ormsby.2
After 1972, however, this completely centralized and generally
sedate world of school administration disintegrated – corroded
from within by the passing of old traditions and harassed from
without by powerful new forces that radically challenged how
schools were governed and administered. As political
manifestations of colonialism came under attack around the world
after 1945, so, too, did old colonial pattern of school governance.
Strident new demands for political and personal freedoms,
challenges to the established social order, and a generalized revolt
against authority from family living rooms to state corridors
produced a decade of social excitement and turbulence that
surfaced in the early 1960s and ran through the early 1970s,
transforming all manner of social, political, and educational
institutions along the way. Dramatic growth in the under-30
population energized a many-sided movement for change that led
by the late 1960s, if not to a social revolution, then at least to a
cultural prison-break in which long-neglected constituencies, as
well as new coalitions, clamoured for recognition of their rights –
and expression of these rights – in legislative provision of
categorical programs and services in education as well as in other
portfolios of government. The politics of identity had arrived and
were about to be felt in one of society’s most conservative agencies
– the public school.
Within a broad and, sometimes, kaleidoscopic crusade for
change, educational institutions found themselves the subject of a
new and vigorous public scrutiny in British Columbia and
elsewhere. Viewed in the headlights of a new era, British
Columbia’s public education system did not seem to be particularly
democratic in its treatment of minorities, women, the handicapped,
or the culturally diverse. Nor, indeed, did the historical precincts of
school governance and management seem anything more than a
gentlemen’s club of professional administrators headed by a select
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group of government mandarins in Victoria, in effect  a “closed-
shop” to many others. As the 1970s began, even politicians
conceded it was time to reorganize school policy-making along
more democratic lines and to redistribute authority more widely
throughout the educational system. 
Even before the 1960s drew to a close, it was apparent the “old
order” of school governance and administration in British
Columbia was unravelling. Developments within government’s
education department, as well as social and political changes
outside it, were disrupting the tranquillity that had long
characterized the offices of the governments education bureau. Part
of the disquietude was internal.  By the late 1960s, the education
department had become a mature and aging unit of government that
had done little to renew itself since 1945. Complacency had
become the price of success. In keeping with its past, senior staff
continued to be “hand-picked” from “the field” by the provincial
superintendent or deputy minister. Recruits brought to headquarters
usually consisted of men with long administrative service, first as
principals and, later, as inspectors and district superintendents. 
Election of Dave Barrett’s New Democratic Party (NDP) in
1972 only created further problems for the department.3 The new
government’s general distrust of the educational civil service was
soon made evident when Minister of Education Eileen Dailly
moved aside the departments senior staff in favour of outside
appointments, including that of educational commissioner, John
Bremer, a self-styled “egalitarian progressive” known for his
“school without walls” experiment in Philadelphia.4 Dailly and the
new government were clear in their intentions: they wished to
overturn the old administrative order that centralized educational
authority in the senior civil service and their agents in the field –
the district superintendents. Having promised throughout the
campaign to decentralize educational government, Dailly sought
ways to refocus the school system around “the teacher, the parent,
and the child” instead of “the superintendent, the principal, and the
teacher,” as it was in the past.5  Dailly’s dream of a status
revolution was intended to break the grip of the educational past
and, in keeping with the organizational fashion of  the time, to
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redistribute power and authority more broadly so that those
affected by decisions would have a hand in shaping them.
But from the beginning, Dailly was hounded by miscues and
misadventures. Commissioner Bremer’s seemingly aimless
excursions around the province led to his public dismissal by the
premier and cost the education minister a considerable loss of face.
Dailly’s establishment of a new “research and development
division,” headed by Stanley Knight, “to assist in the development
of changes in education,” proved equally disastrous. The “R and D”
group’s radical edge brought it into open conflict with the
Department’s old guard, forcing Dailly to suspend its operations.
Shocked by her maladroitness, even the British Columbia
Teachers’ Federation (BCTF), which had campaigned vigorously
for the NDP government, called for her resignation.6 According to
historians Jean Barman and Neil Sutherland, “Mrs. Dailly seemed
incapable of decisive action, and her tenure was characterized
mostly by preparing for change rather than its implementation.”7
Inside the newly renamed “Ministry of Education,” tensions
were aggravated further by volatile social and educational forces
outside government. Beginning in the early 1970s, the provincial
education office found itself whipsawed by assorted equity, access,
and accountability issues raised, in part, by long-neglected and
disenfranchised constituencies who challenged the fairness of
school policies as they pertained to handicapped or “special needs”
groups, children, women, and minorities.8  As educational
government struggled to address these calls for broader, fairer, and
more “inclusionary” school policies, new and no less vigorous
constituencies were demanding other kinds of accountability to do
with reducing educational costs and improving public education’s
academic performance. Government found itself defenceless
against the double-edged sword of accountability, whether defined
in terms of “inclusion” or fiscal responsibility. 
Public alarm with the rising costs of schools was well founded.
In the 24-year period from 1947 to 1971, school expenditures had
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increased 35-fold.9  Educational expenditures in 1971 were of a
magnitude that surpassed the entire provincial budget only nine
years earlier, representing nearly 29 per cent of total provincial
expenditures compared to only 15 per cent twenty years before.10
At the same time, fears about declining scholastic scores in schools
were making headlines in the popular press. They reflected a rising
tide of public unease about the quality of public education and the
efforts of dissatisfied parent and community groups to hold
government more accountable for what was taking place in schools.
Unmoved by promises of new programs and services, parents
began to insist that educational government provide evidence about
how well youngsters could read, write, and add.11 
Teacher Power 
Public restlessness with issues to do with inclusion and quality
was more than matched by discontent within the ranks of teachers.
From 1972 to 1996, the provincial government’s chief adversary in
schooling was the BCTF, an organization that functioned, more or
less, as the government’s “unofficial opposition” in all matters
educational, regardless of which party was in power. During this
time, the BCTF proved to be far more influential in shaping
government educational policy than all other major provincial
organizations interested in education, including the British
Columbia School Trustees’ Association (BCSTA), and the
Association of British Columbia School Superintendents
(ABCSS).12 
Throughout the twentieth century’s first half, the BCTF had
generally worked co-operatively with government and enjoyed far
greater influence within the education department than the trustees’
organization, which was regarded as something of a nuisance by
civil service professionals.13 Prominent Federation members such
as John Lister, Harry Charlesworth, and Bernard Gillie maintained
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close contact with the Department of Education throughout their
terms as Federation presidents or executive secretaries. Others,
such as C.G. Brown, Colonel Johnny Burnett, Joe Phillipson, and
R.B. Cox, enlisted as provincial school inspectors when their
presidencies in the Federation ended. The equalization that UBC
professor Max Cameron’s 1946 consolidation plan imposed on the
system, along with the fine-tunings of school finance formulas
offered by the department’s men, Harold Campbell and J.F.K.
English, in the 1950s, settled many of the BCTF’s long-standing
concerns about teacher welfare and security and provided a
platform for the Federation to widen its influence in other areas. 
As the 1960s began, the Federation turned its hand, first, to
enlarging teacher influence in curricular and instructional domains,
and, later, to strengthening its influence in educational policy-
making, including promotion of larger social justice issues. In
1967, J. Harley Robertson summed up his year as BCTF president
by emphasizing a changing attitude in the Federation’s
membership: “Teachers have shown that they no longer wish to be
cast in a submissive role in education. The growing militancy has
led teachers directly to campaign on class size, to act politically, to
use publicity in their areas of interest [and] to seek support for their
educational demands.”14  Such activities, of course, put the BCTF
on a collision course with the Department of Education and with
the Social Credit Government in general. 
This new-found militancy was variously expressed. It was
made manifest in B.C. Teacher editorials critical of the
government’s building program, as well as the teachers’ 1969
“apple” campaign which first challenged funding levels and
endorsed candidates in accord with the Federation’s position.
Angered by the BCTF’s intrusion into provincial politics, Social
Credit education minister Leslie Peterson introduced a legislative
amendment in 1971 excusing teachers from automatic membership
in the Federation. Although fewer than 500 of the province’s
22,000 teachers revoked their membership as a result of this
legislation, it signified the beginning of an educational “cold war”
that intensified as the BCTF executive edged closer to political
alignment with the NDP.
In the 1972 election, a Teachers’ Political Action Committee
(TPAC) was formed to raise funds to oppose the re-election of the
Social Credit government, thereby circumventing the legal question
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about whether the BCTF’s general revenues could be used to
campaign against a political party.  Thirty-two of the thirty-five
candidates endorsed by TPAC won seats as the NDP administration
began its “1,000-day” regime. The BCTF executive was by now
firmly in the hands of militants, notably supporters of the “radical
Marxist” Jim McFarlan, to use historian F. Henry Johnson’s
description, who was twice voted Federation president in the early
1970s.15 McFarlan and his group within the Federation believed
schools should be used as instruments of social change, a view
earlier espoused by American educational reconstructionists in the
1930s. McFarlan was not at all shy about exercising his political
clout. In two instances – one about class size and one about
Knight’s dismissal as R and D chief – McFarlan called for Minister
Dailly’s resignation, marking the only two occasions in provincial
school history when the Federation demanded a minister’s removal.
Movement toward a more radical stance was further evident in
the 1977 formation of the Teachers’ Viewpoint, another splinter
group within the BCTF, which sought to develop a “new kind of
progressive caucus.”16  Fronted at times by Surrey teacher David
Chudnovsky, the Teachers’ Viewpoint group aspired to the same
sort of labour solidarity that Rural Teachers’ Federation (RTF)
advocates had demanded in the 1930s and 1940s. As Chudnovsky
argued: “It is essential that there be an organized group of B.C.
teachers openly and consciously working to build a union with the
right to strike – in other words beginning  the task of uniting
teachers with other workers.”17 Naturally, Chudnovsky’s teachers’
union offered no place for principals or others who held “primarily
management functions.”18 This militancy spilled over into the
BCTF executive. The Federation’s three presidents from 1981 to
1987 – Larry Kuehn, Pat Clarke, and Elsie McMurphy – were all
members of the Teachers’ Viewpoint group, as were other
executive officers.19 
Despite divisions and friction inside the Federation, and public
concerns regarding the influence that fringe and radical elements
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wielded over the membership, the BCTF, by and large, remained
a cohesive political force and an able combatant for government.
It had reached, by its own admission, its “full maturity” as a
professional and political organization, ever mindful of the external
and, sometimes, hostile environment in which it saw itself
operating.20  Part of this was because of the organizational and
political sophistication of the executive, the Federation’s wealth
and status as the province’s largest educational organization, and
the fact that its ranks virtually doubled from 22,000 to nearly
45,000 members between 1972 and 1996. Part of its new-found
power was also attributable to its success in convincing parents and
the public that “input measures” such as higher salaries for
teachers, smaller class sizes, and other improvements in learning
conditions were more salient and credible measures of educational
quality than the standardized measurements of pupil performance
that provincial authorities tried to introduce in the late 1970s and
early 1980s. 
The Federation was equally successful in persuading parents
and the public that the most important educational outcomes to do
with higher thinking, creativity, and love of learning defied
measurement by standardized tests. Even when the Ministry
developed clear and objective measures of district, school, and
pupil performance in the early 1980s, it found itself compromised
by circumstances beyond its control. Provincial officials were
reluctant to publish management information and student
performance data which illustrated wide variance in district-to-
district, as well as inter-district, educational outcomes lest parents
and the public make the lack of system-wide equity and
accountability even more difficult political issues. And so, data sets
illustrative of the system’s condition remained out of public view,
open only to bureaucrats and their political masters inside
provincial and local board offices. Like the engineer in Hamlet,
“hoist with his own petard,” the Ministry found itself impotent in
waging war for the hearts and minds of British Columbians with
weapons it built but dared not use.21
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Disconnecting Governance and Administration
The NDP’s election in 1972 also raised anew an older question
about who should control school district leadership.  This issue,
which first surfaced in the early 1900s with the Vancouver board’s
demand for autonomy, was reborn in the early 1950s when the
BCSTA proposed that control over senior administrative
appointments in local schools should rest with district boards, not
with the province. Since then, the BCSTA, as well as the BCTF,
had forcefully expressed the idea of a decentralized system during
Sperrin Chant’s 1960 royal commission inquiry, arguing,
essentially, that the restructuring that Cameron’s one-man
commission recommended in 1945 had changed the bases of power
among districts but had done nothing to address power relationship
between district boards and the province.22
Calls for changing the control of local school leadership were
largely ignored by the province during W.A.C. Bennett’s Social
Credit regime in the 1950s and 1960s. The Department of
Education and its political leadership were otherwise preoccupied,
principally with designing a new post-secondary system. Nor was
Bennett, an avowed centralist in behaviour, likely to have listened
to his education advisors even if they had been moved to suggest
such a change, which they were not. Bennett kept the Department
of Education at arm’s length as a rule, preferring to limit his
association to brief annual meetings with Ed Espley, the
Department’s comptroller, during which time Bennett reputedly
presented the educational civil service with annual budgets that
sometimes bore little  resemblance to estimates  submitted through
ministers.23 With Bennett’s political passing,  the local control issue
made its way onto the tables of government for the first time in
1972, abetted by the NDP’s commitment to relocate decision
making “out there, among the people,” as one senior civil servant
of the day put it.24 
In part, the local employment issue was also ignited by events
inside the educational civil service itself. The department’s field
officers, the inspectors and, after 1958, the district superintendents,
had long felt aggrieved over their low salaries. Again, this was an
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historical issue raised first during Alexander Robinson’s reign as
school chief in the early years of the century and by the Provincial
School Inspectors’ Association in the 1930s and 1940s.25 Each time
the complaint was similar and each time the issue remained
unresolved. Inspectors resented the fact that high school principals
around the province were routinely paid considerably more than
either inspectors or superintendents, even though principalships
were generally held to be less important offices in the province’s
educational hierarchy. School commissioners Putman and Weir
and, later, Chant condemned this practice in 1925 and 1960
respectively, arguing that this financial anomaly had deleterious
effects on recruiting the best people to the normal schools, the
provincial inspectorate, and the superintendency. 
The stumbling block was the civil service classification scale,
or “salary tree,” as it was more commonly known, where
increments among “grades” were small and so tightly prescribed
that even long-serving and powerful deputy ministers like S.J.
Willis could not move the civil service commission to secure relief
for his senior staff.26 As district-based principals’ salaries increased
more rapidly in the 1950s and 1960s, differences in compensation
between principals and superintendents became more acute and
professionally embarrassing for superintendents. One provincially
paid superintendent disclosed that his job as chief education officer
for a large urban district in the 1960s secured for him a rank of 57th
on the district's salary scale.27
For many superintendents, salary was a proxy for status and
respect. As experienced civil servants, inspectors and the district
superintendents who superseded them had endured years of
itinerancy and hardship. Their careers were often a patchwork of
assignments resulting in a gypsy-like existence that took them from
one end of the province to another, always at the department’s call.
At a moment’s notice, they could be dispatched to manage a district
hundreds of miles away or more. Moving meant uprooting families,
selling houses, and changing children’s schools. Oftimes these
changes proved financially burdensome, especially when it came
to purchasing homes in more expensive districts.  Nevertheless,
most persevered, sustained by the beliefs that, ultimately, “the
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department would look after its men,” and that loyalty and faithful
service would be rewarded.28 However, as the 1960s drew to a
close, the long-festering salary issue seemed no closer to settlement
than decades earlier and the government’s education officers began
to despair of the civil service and its unwillingness to address the
inequity that so obviously existed. Even to the most committed,
such intransigence seemed to signal a fundamental lack of regard
on government’s part.
Tensions over salary and respect were aggravated by other
difficulties within the Department. Continued conflict between
“old” and “new” factions in senior management led to a climate of
uncertainty throughout the province’s education bureau in the early
1970s. Before long, district superintendents were dividing
themselves into camps “for” and “against” local employment.
Legislation passed in 1974 allowing the province’s largest districts
to appoint their own superintendents proved a turning point in
tipping the scales in favour of local employment. After half a dozen
years of discussion and negotiation, the province capitulated and,
in August 1980, legislation was introduced granting all provincial
school districts the authority to appoint their own superintendents.
Much like King John’s signature on the Magna Carta, which
recognized a changing England, provincial legislation allowing
boards to appoint their own school leaders likewise ushered in a
new age. From this time on, the province would maintain
responsibility for the governance of schooling but would delegate
responsibility for local school administration to others. 
The historical significance of this event, not to mention its
consequences, was missed by both sides.  Few in educational
government, or in local school administration, appreciated that the
future would be remarkably different from the past. Disconnecting
school governance and administration – two functions unified for
more than 100 years – meant more than simply eliminating
imperial administrative traditions. It bespoke a deep division, or
disconnection, at the public system’s core. On one hand, it meant
a change in the allegiance of superintendents from provincial
authorities to their new political masters on school boards. On the
other, it meant superintendents were removed from government’s
inner circle and, thus, no longer privy to the political intelligence
that government’s field officers historically enjoyed. Above all, it
marked what would prove to be the beginning of  a new and
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adversarial chapter in school history. From now on, seventy-five
districts, represented by their own educational standard bearers,
would compete with each other – and struggle with senior
government –  for their share of what was fast becoming an
inelastic provincial budget. 
Government Adrift
The province’s decision to grant local districts control over
senior administrative appointments largely severed  its relationship
with the real world of schools and, in so doing, changed the
organizational character of the Ministry of Education in several
ways.  First and foremost, it meant that provincial authorities had
to devise new ways to govern the system without a tangible
administrative presence. This they did by developing a new and
different authority structure that had less to do with the individual
expertise of  government officers, or with government’s symbolic
role in leadership, and more to do with new policies and technical
procedures designed to direct and monitor the system by remote
control.29  The new approach was a model of educational
government based on laws and policies, rather than a model of
“government by men,” as the old colonial regime of school
administration had been.30 As such, it was predicated far more on
the tasks of measuring, evaluating, analyzing, rationalizing, and
equalizing educational inputs and outputs than with understanding
human elements of school management. 
This change in view reflected the growing size, complexity,
and cost of schooling at both provincial and local levels. As
education grew to become an enormous industry in the 1970s, and
as public demands for greater efficiency, equity, and accountability
increased, government found itself with little choice but to adopt
quantitative assessment strategies transforming other large
organizations throughout North America at the time, and to apply
these strategies in governing the system. The government’s new
approach was made manifest in various initiatives:  to wit,
establishing the provincial learning assessment program in 1976;
introducing the core curriculum in 1977; reorganizing special
programs branch in 1978; setting out budgetary incentive grants in
1979; implementing the fiscal restraint program in 1982, as well as
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developing the government’s “Indicators of Management
Performance” that same year; and, finally, reintroducing provincial
exams in 1984.31  These policy and procedural developments
outlined a portrait of a ministry that had come to see its role
principally as that of evaluating, monitoring, and controlling what
was being taught, what was being learned, and what was being
spent. In other words, the provincial government had carved out for
itself two key tasks of governance – defining what was essential in
schooling and providing measures to illustrate the system’s
accountability. Although government’s education bureau had
always supervised such matters, it attempted to do so now through
newly developed management information systems rather than
through century-old face-to-face traditions of field inspection.
However effective or efficient in practice, this new technocratic
approach to educational governance was badly flawed in one
important respect.   As regulatory and bureaucratic supervision
took the place of the visible and personal administration that the
Ministry and its staff had long provided, there appeared to be a
leadership vacuum at the top of the system. 
Minister Brian Smith’s 1980 educational tour of the province
did little to alter this perception. Conceived as an attempt to fly the
provincial colours, Smith’s initiative marked the first of three
government reform efforts in the 1980s to collect public and
educational information on which to base a new mandate for the
schools.32 Smith’s tour, comprised of forty-one public forums,
proved generally unsuccessful in establishing new directions for
government or the schools, principally because of its lack of focus,
its reliance on meagre amounts of anecdotal evidence, and its
narrow interest in structural questions of dubious significance. To
illustrate, Smith wanted to know, among other things: Could a case
be made for middle schools? Community schools? What
constituted the ideal size for secondary schools? And, should
multiple entry points be made available to kindergarten youngsters?
The relevance of Smith’s questions was difficult to understand,
particularly to a school system assailed by rapidly rising costs,
unprecedented political discord about school policy at provincial
and local levels, public outcries for fiscal and performance
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accountability from certain quarters, and, from others, assorted
demands for new programs and services for women, handicapped
children, Aboriginals, inner-city youngsters, immigrants, English-
as-a-Second-Language (ESL) learners, and French-speaking British
Columbians. When Smith’s “Apple” report was released in 1981 –
so named because of the symbolic red apple on its cover –  it
tackled neither the structural questions raised in public discussion
nor addressed what schools should or should not do. The report’s
character was vague. About school structures, Smith simply
indicated that “the Ministry will study the advantages and
disadvantages of the various school organization patterns.”33 About
the scope of the school’s responsibility, the report offered nothing
but shop-worn platitudes about sharing responsibility between
provincial and local governments, as well as among school and
other community agencies. If Voltaire was correct in remarking
that his literary rival Diderot mastered “the grand art of saying
nothing” in 43 volumes, Smith’s “Apple” report likely
accomplished the same feat in only 183 pages.
Problems that Smith and subsequent education ministers faced
in defining an appropriate mandate for provincial schools went far
beyond the education portfolio to the foundations of modern
government itself. The question of whether the school could serve
effectively as both an educational and social agency was
intertwined with deeper political and philosophical issues about the
extent of state intervention in private life and whether government
should serve to ensure the emergence of a providential state
attending to human needs from “womb to tomb.” By the late 1970s,
however, the social and political philosophy of liberalism upon
which Canadian and other Western governments had been
premised for more than a century was losing considerable political
currency at home and abroad.34  Beleaguered by three decades of
public debt, and mindful of reduced levels of government in Great
Britain, the United States, and New Zealand, federal authorities in
Ottawa attempted to stem rising public sector costs through a
“wage and price controls” program in 1978. Around the same time,
critics in and outside government began to question liberalism’s
efficacy and called for a new and more limited role for government
in various arenas of social life, including schools. 
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These events marked the beginning of an important
philosophical transition in public education – a transition away
from a view of schools as universal and providential agencies to
one that saw schools as institutions more loosely structured and
diverse in character.35 As I put it in 1993:
Gone is the confidence within government – and the public –
that the problems of schools, or those of society, can be
corrected by larger infusions of public money into education.
Gone is the optimism – certainly among senior policy makers
– that this period of economic recession and restraint is but a
temporary interruption to the normal flow of events and that,
when the economy rebounds, it will be “business as usual.”
Gone, too, it seems, is the vast, unwritten, and long-lived
public consensus that schooling should be predominantly state-
controlled, that the public school should be common to every
child’s life, and that public education is the most effective
institutional cornerstone of democratic living.36
As this view emerged in the mid-1970s, the British Columbia
Ministry of Education –  and, indeed, other branches of government
– found itself having to reconcile the liberal “input” model of
public provision with an emerging neo-conservative or post-liberal
view which favoured a more restrained approach to government’s
role in public and private life and much greater emphasis on
measuring the “outputs” achieved by public spending.37
Reconciliation, however, was complicated. Throughout the
twentieth century, both government and the education profession
had defined progress exclusively in terms of “inputs.” Directing
more money and resources to  schools was generally held to
produce “good” or “better” educational quality and performance.
To schoolmen and schoolwomen of the post-World-War-II era – as
well as the public at large – it was axiomatic that increased levels
of educational support led directly to newer schools, more
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extensive and richer educational programs, a more complete range
of school services, more modern athletic and other facilities, and
smaller class sizes.  Such investments, it was generally assumed,
were ultimately associated with better schools and higher pupil
performance. 
Nurtured in this orthodoxy, bureaucrats had difficulty
imagining educational improvements in other terms, even when
they learned that ambitious and expensive educational reform
efforts in the U. S. during the late 1960s and early 1970s had
generally failed to reach their objectives. Educational managers
long accustomed to measuring success in larger staffs, bigger
programs, an expanding list of “clients,” and budgets that
appreciated year after year, were ill-adapted to “keep score” in
other ways or to rationalize a change in government perspective to
countless “stakeholder” groups who had prompted government
growth by lobbying for additional programs and services in the first
place. People in and outside the system had come to believe in an
ever-expanding universe of government provision. In other words,
as government sought to shed itself  of the responsibility for
enlarging public services to secure progress and equity, it attempted
to do so in a climate of social uncertainty in which older liberal
ideas had yet to be discarded while the tenets of the new
conservatism had yet to be embraced. Evidence of this ideological
unease abounded in the popular press of the day, in policy-making
journals, and in the committee rooms of government itself, where
ministerial and inter-ministerial battles raged about the scope, cost,
and purpose of government activity.
Making things even more complex for itself, the Ministry of
Education  sought to quell rising special-interest-group demands by
adopting a new and confusing language of governance. Nothing
had changed since the nineteenth century when the  British North
America Act (1867) – renamed the Constitution Act in 1982 –
placed responsibility for school governance firmly in the hands of
provincial legislatures and their educational agencies. Despite this
legislation’s clarity, it became fashionable in governance and
administrative circles of the post-1972 period for politicians,
bureaucrats, professors, and special-interest groups to speak of
concepts such as “decentralized control,” “co-governance,”
“educational partnerships,” and “stakeholder groups,” as if such
terms actually held legal meaning. This rhetoric was meant, of
course, to reflect the anti-authoritarian and highly democratic mood
of the time. It was also used in and around educational government
as a social and political lubricant to “cool out” dissent through what
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organizationalists term “co-optation.” Its usage, however, backfired
by giving rise to a mythology suggesting that school governance
was a “shared” responsibility between provincial and local
authorities, inflating local expectations for more widespread
participation in the educational affairs of state, and bringing into
question the province’s legitimacy in acting alone as chief
educational custodian at times of economic or social crisis.
Ambiguity about “who should govern what” clearly
contributed to the educational conflicts that erupted as British
Columbia entered the early 1980s. A recession in the province’s
basic resource industries greatly reduced provincial revenue while
public sector costs, particularly in health care and education,
continued to mushroom. By the late 1970s, school board
expenditures in British Columbia were easily outstripping “Basic
Education Program” (BEP) allowances, driving up school budgets
and property taxes. On average, school board budgets increased 19
per cent province-wide in 1981 and school taxes rose 25 per cent
province-wide over the previous year. In Vancouver, school taxes
in 1981 were 40 per cent higher than the year before, leading to
taxpayer protests and petitions to senior government for relief.
Altogether in the five-year period from 1976 to 1981, public school
costs rose from $900 million to $1.6 billion, an increase of nearly
80 per cent at a time when the provincial school population had
declined by 32,000 pupils. By 1982, almost 20 per cent of British
Columbia’s total budget was being spent on schools.38
Provincial Restraint and the School Wars 
Driven by a need to stem rising public sector costs, the
provincial government convened a retreat for ministers and senior
officials in January 1982 at Schooner Cove on Vancouver Island.
A month later, Premier Bill Bennett announced his intention to pass
the Public Service Restraint Act and, in March 1982, the Education
Interim Finance Act, which allowed the province to set limits on
school district budgets and removed boards’ capacity to tax
commercial property. Boards wishing to spend more than 110 per
cent of their BEP would now have to secure the approval of local
taxpayers in a referendum. Teachers, trustees, and government
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workers responded angrily to the restraint program. Layoffs of 400
and, later, 1,600 provincial employees led to a series of
demonstrations numbering 20,000, 25,000, 40,000, and 60,000
protesters in the summer and autumn of 1983. During the next two
years of what journalist Crawford Kilian called the “school wars,”
teachers expressed their discontent with spending cuts through job
actions and a six-day strike in November 1983.39 Trustees first
contested the legislation unsuccessfully in court and, later, refused
compliance to provincial demands for lower budgets, a decision
that led to the dismissal of the entire Vancouver board and the
appointment of Allan Stables, an “official government trustee.”
Shortly after, the Cowichan board was also dismissed. All in all,
thirty-five school districts that initially claimed they would resist
the government’s demands for reductions eventually submitted. 
With the advent of restraint, the BCTF cast itself as the chief
defender of the educational faith, pre-empting all others in its claim
to speak on behalf of children and parents. Moreover, as the
restraint program made provincial education officials – and, indeed,
ministers of the day – educational pariahs, it was a relatively simple
matter for the Federation to recite old truths and platitudes about
the importance of increasing levels of educational spending,
extending the school’s social mandate into ESL programs,  meals
programs for inner-city children, and other interventions which
generally endorsed the expansionist sentiments of earlier and more
prosperous times. 
Emboldened by post-1970s claims to a new-found
professionalism, the BCTF had also begun to press school boards
for better working conditions in the early 1980s  and for greater
measures of teacher autonomy. Both teacher “locals” and the
Federation targeted reductions in teachers’ workload as “a battle to
be won.” Since 1946, when Vernon teachers sought freedom from
pupil supervision chores during lunch-time, teachers had tried
without much success to bargain about working conditions, only to
be informed by boards that such things were non-negotiable. By the
early 1980s, fewer  than one-third of local associations enjoyed any
form of duty-free lunch-break clauses in their contracts.”40 As West
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Vancouver Teachers’ Association president Kit Krieger noted: “A
local bargaining survey showed that after salaries, workload was
most important to teachers.  Key specific items included reduced
class size and duty-free lunch hours.”41 These items, however, were
the thin end of a much larger agenda that included: “firm class size
limits”; “preparation time expressed as hours of instruction”; “full
professional autonomy and professional control over educational
change”; definition of “work year and the duration of the school
day”; and “professional control over teaching.”42 Some local
associations also demanded additional payment for teacher
involvement in extra-curricular activities. A teachers’
newsmagazine article advised that, to achieve a “5.5 hour working
day,” teachers should eliminate homework assignments, “all
coaching and refereeing” duties, sponsorship of school-award
programs, “volunteer supervision,” and committee service, as well
as “fund-raising” and “social conscience” activities.43  
The restraint program, although effective in capping
educational spending, proved costly in other ways. As never before,
it separated the Ministry of Education from educators in general,
and teachers in particular, greatly diminishing the credibility of
education ministers and their senior staff to portray themselves as
stewards of public schooling. As the restraint program became
depicted by the press – and by teachers – as something of a western
morality play in which forces of darkness were pitted against forces
of light, Victoria’s provincial bureaucracy was increasingly
criticized by teachers, administrators, and parents for its part in “the
assault,” as critics put it, “on public education.” 
The government’s restraint program inadvertently opened a
window of opportunity for the BCTF and local school trustees to
make enormous political capital by positioning themselves as
public education’s chief crusaders, regardless of their own
particular interests and motives. Public sector restraint, according
to Kilian, also drove teachers farther into the bosom of the labour
movement, something they had resisted since the 1940s:  
Having been blooded in the province-wide strike,  teachers
could calmly contemplate the pros and cons of striking locally.
In that respect, the teaching profession in B. C. had become
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permanently more politicized, as it moved closer to the centre
of the labour movement. Teachers had begun to see themselves
less as aspiring professionals and more as workers, no longer
kidding themselves that a university degree and a teaching
certificate somehow elevated them above the ranks of the
working class. If that was a development deplored by many
British Columbians, they had only themselves to blame for it.44
At the restraint program’s apogee in the mid-1980s, it seemed
no educational official – either elected or appointed – was prepared
to speak forthrightly on behalf of the province’s schools or the
youngsters who attended them. Ministry personnel, either silenced
by their political masters or instructed by senior officials to stay off
the political skyline, went to ground and, as a result,
communication between the educational civil service and “the
field” virtually ceased except for discussion of routine matters.45
With Ministry staff confined to Government Street bunkers, the
immense educational ship-of-state appeared in effect to be without
captain, crew, or sense of direction. 
Making Matters Worse: Legislative Changes, 1987
While the BCTF and the provincial government battled like
Titans in the heavens over control of provincial schools, British
Columbia principals were involved in their own imbroglio with the
BCTF executive and some of its members regarding their place as
a specialist organization within the Federation, a subject of dispute
since the 1987 Industrial Relations Act classified principals, vice-
principals, and supervisory staff as “senior management.”46  The
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November 1983 teachers’ strike and subsequent job actions, as well
as lay-offs of about 2,000 teachers in the wake of restraint, had
aggravated tensions between the British Columbia Principals’ and
Vice-Principals’ Association (BCPVPA) and teachers in general.
Principals themselves were torn by the 1983 strike. Some crossed
the picket lines and others sided with the teachers and refused to
staff the schools. Seija Tyllinen’s 1988 study of the BCPVPA’s
separation from the Federation reports a “stubbornness on both
sides” and concludes that “the promulgation of the Teaching
Profession Act may have simply accelerated the process of
separation” already under way.47 
Feeling increasingly marginalized and pressed to silence by
their compatriots inside the Federation, principals’ association
executives began to meet privately in the mid-1980s with education
ministers Hewitt and, later, Brummet, to explore their options.
Meanwhile, inside Vander Zalm’s Social Credit government,
cabinet members were wrestling with an important conundrum. The
BCTF had decided to launch a test case concerning the
government’s restriction on salaries under the compensation
stabilization program, catching the provincial government
unprepared. And, as the Federation’s case took shape, the
government grew less inclined to contest it. 
Cabinet finally convinced itself that passage of the “right
legislation” could solve two problems. By granting teachers control
of their own professional development through creation of a
teachers’ college – something teachers had called for since the
1950s – their public voice might become more professional in tone,
like colleges of medicine and law, and thus more amenable to
government. A “college of teachers,” the cabinet surmised, might
also accentuate divisions between “professional” and “union”
perspectives long in a state of tension among the membership,
thereby allowing the moderate majority of teachers to prevail over
the Federation’s radical and militant elements. The government’s
reasoning, though flawed, was transparent. Such legislation might
divide the BCTF and undermine its power. Introducing additional
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legislation to separate principals from teachers, this reasoning
further held, could shore up management’s control of the schools
by defining principals and vice-principals exclusively as officers of
the board.48 The BCTF’s Al Cornes  portrayed  the  legislation  as
a “long shot”   where government probably thought “Let’s give the
******* what they want, but let’s throw a cog in the works, too.”49
In any event, cabinet’s estimate of the legislation’s impact likely
failed to factor in the profound distrust with which teachers held
the Social Credit government in the wake of the bitterly
remembered – and contested – public sector restraint program. By
January 1988, 97 per cent of teachers had rejoined the BCTF.50 
Interestingly, the two pieces of legislation, which would cast
a far longer shadow across schools than ever imagined, were
crafted in law offices outside the educational civil service.
Educational officers in the Ministry of Education, including John
Walsh, who headed the government’s legislative and policy
section, did not see the government’s proposed bills until one hour
before their release and at no time were given an opportunity to
review or comment on the efficacy of the legislation.51  This event,
in itself, amply signaled that the civil service’s historical influence
in school policy-making was broken and that control had passed
over to the political domain. More than this, these legislative
enactments ushered in a new and turbulent era of labour relations
in schools that separated principals from teachers, made principals
exiles in their own schools, and challenged the nature of
administrative authority – this time at the school level.
Diffusion and Ambiguity Within
Part of the governance problem the Ministry of Education
faced in the 1970s and 1980s was the increasingly diffuse character
of the ministry itself. In 1972, when the NDP assumed the
government’s reins, the Department of Education was still a small
and relatively flat organization headed by a deputy minister, six
modestly supported divisional superintendents, and fourteen
“special officials.” With clerical staff, and the fifty-nine district
superintendents who worked outside headquarters, the entire civil
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service complement, numbering only 136,  was responsible for
presiding over the governance and administration of 1,515 schools,
four universities, and ten community colleges.52 In the post-
imperial years from 1972 to 1979, as the department’s status was
raised to that of a ministry, its staff grew from 136 to 598 members,
with an accompanying five-fold increase in budget, illustrating that
the chief characteristic of post-colonial regimes everywhere, as a
British civil servant ironically observed in the 1940s, was to
produce “more government instead of good government.”53 Growth
in Ministry ranks, however, did not last long. The Socred
government’s restraint program shrank the size of the Ministry
from 780 to 435 staff from the early to mid-1980s. By this time, the
Ministry no longer counted the fifty-nine locally employed
superintendents on its roster, nor included the post-secondary
branch, which had become a separate ministry. 
The growing ambiguity of purpose within educational
government between 1972 and 1992 can be illustrated in the
bureaucratic growth that took place. In 1972, the education office’s
functions were confined to six branches –  administrative services,
field services, instructional services, post-secondary services,
special services, and technical-vocational services. In 1992, the
Ministry, stripped of district superintendents and the post-
secondary side, was divided into twenty-nine different “branches
and functions,” principally to handle emerging demands for special
programs and services.54  Among the panoply of new offices was
the Aboriginal education branch, the business immigration branch,
the immigration policy branch, the independent schools branch, the
information services branch, the languages and multicultural
programs branch, the gender equity and women’s programs unit,
and the planning and corporate research branch. 
Multiplication of government programs and services
compounded the ever-difficult task of governing the K-12 system
by enlarging the task of managing the education ministry itself.
Even by the mid-1980s as these new divisions and special branches
were evolving, it had become a complex undertaking for senior
officials to oversee the activities and purposes of the Ministry’s
various sub-units, much less to co-ordinate their initiatives or to
234 Historical Studies in Education / Revue d’histoire de l’éducation
55 See, for example, Jeffrey Simpson, “No time to waste in restoring common
sense to our education system,” The Globe and Mail, 15 May 1991, A16; and Jeffrey
Simpson, “Never mind input variables – what Canada needs is rebellion,” The Globe
and Mail, 16 Dec. 1992, A20.  The debate, as captured by the press, is somewhat
overdrawn and reads at times like a modern morality play.  To be sure, liberal or
progressive views about schooling are widely expressed throughout the education
profession; still, few recent articles on education note that many parents favour child-
centred systems of schooling over those of a more traditional character.  Likewise, the
press typically attributes conservative views to those in business and industry which,
again, may not be altogether accurate.  Within educational ranks across the country
can be found numerous teachers and principals who remain committed to formal and
traditional approaches to schooling.  However, in broad terms, the press is generally
correct in arguing that those inside and those outside schools hold fundamentally
different agendas for schools and about what is essential in education.
56 Department of Education, One Hundred Years, 96-97.  The provincial
superintendent’s position was merged with that of the deputy minister in 1931.
57 Ibid.
understand what they were actually doing or why they were doing
it. The growing organizational complexity at the provincial level
paralleled similar developments within large district systems in
Vancouver and Victoria, leading parents and the public to wonder,
“Who, if anyone, is in charge of public schooling?”55  In short,
growth in educational government’s size and scope after 1972,
which reflected a national trend, obscured the locus of authority in
public education and made it difficult to know who was responsible
for what. 
Discontinuity
Adding to public confusion about school leadership were
numerous personnel changes at political and senior civil service
levels during the 1980s and 1990s. Such changes stood in marked
contrast to the continuity that historically had characterized British
Columbia’s education office. During the first eighty-one years of
public school history, six senior civil servants presided over
educational affairs as provincial superintendents of education or,
after 1931, as deputy ministers.56 Taking a longer perspective, only
twelve superintendents or deputies administered the system during
the province’s first 114 years.57 By the 1980s, however, both the
deputy’s and the minister’s office were becoming organizational
carousels in which few elected or appointed officials held seats for
long.  In the seven-year period between 1989 and 1996, seven
deputies attempted to steer the helm of educational government. A
deputy-a-year hardly constituted a model of stable leadership by
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any standard.58  Moreover, between 1980 and 1996, eleven
ministers held the education portfolio and, by the early 1990s, the
education minister’s term also averaged only about a year –  a
period far too brief to accomplish anything.59
Discontinuity at the top, coupled with major ministry
restructurings every two years and episodic downsizings, led
naturally to a climate of tentativeness, if not paralysis, throughout
the provincial school bureaucracy. Small wonder that the Ministry
seemed lost and in a perpetual state of searching for its own
identity and mission, especially as administrative positions once
held by educators were restaffed with individuals who knew
government and management but nothing about schools or
education.  Small wonder, also, that Ministry officials lacked
morale and purpose, or that “the vision thing,” as former U.S.
President George Bush inelegantly termed it, was so evidently
missing in the decades after 1972. 
Things became so turbulent at one point in the early 1990s that
the NDP cabinet installed its own “official trustee” to oversee day-
to-day educational affairs and the Ministry’s compliance with
cabinet’s political agenda. This was a clear signal of education’s
new “political” importance as well as a change in the ownership of
public education.  One hundred years of “educational government”
by civil servants had given way to a “government of education” by
premiers’ offices, cabinets, and education ministers all too
conscious that schooling had become too large a public investment
and too large a political issue to be consigned to the care of civil
servants, however expert their credentials might be in its
understanding, organization, and control. The movement by
politicians to strip away the authority traditionally held by senior
educational civil servants inside government was paralleled outside
by a movement on the part of teachers, trustees, parents, and others
to wrestle educational control of schools and school districts from
principals, superintendents, and other school officials. 
For better or worse, a century of professional control over
public education in and outside government corridors was ending
as the 1990s began and a new, more political, and deconstructed
form of authority was beginning to emerge. Within this new
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context, and despite its complement of able professionals, the
education ministry was reduced to three tasks – serving as a
paymaster’s office issuing cheques to keep the system going, a fire-
fighting brigade dispatched to quell the crisis of the day, or,
increasingly after 1988, a cheerleading squad for the minister’s
latest initiative.  Inadvertently, the Ministry of Education had
compromised its historical role as the sentry that monitored the
state and performance of the schools by allowing itself to become
a participant in delivering and advocating certain school programs
and services – two things it had never done in over 120 years of
operations.
The quarter of a century between 1972 and 1996 witnessed the
end of the Imperial Age of school administration in British
Columbia. The historical pattern of strong central control which
had directed the course of provincial schooling for a century was
beginning to unravel even before the 1960s were over, prompted in
part by a malaise inside educational government and by new forces
in and outside schools. Although provincial authorities entered the
1970s still confident in their capacity to control and direct public
education, the Ministry of Education found itself before the decade
ended, like Napoleon’s army retreating from Moscow, bewildered
by an unfamiliar landscape and harried on all sides by adversaries
who seemed to materialize from nowhere, each with its own special
brief for provincial schools.  By the 1980s, the province’s
education bureaucracy, once the dominant and solitary voice in
school affairs, was obliged to compete on the public policy stage
with a chorus of others eager to contest the province’s right to
speak on behalf of children. By the mid-1990s, the rising power of
the teachers’ Federation, increasing parental and public demands
for participation in educational decisions, and the Ministry of
Education’s ambiguity about its own purpose had all served, in
various ways, to reduce the province’s leadership in public
education. 
